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Abstract 
Going forward, Korea faces two closely related challenges: sustaining economic growth against 
the backdrop of a rapidly aging population and ameliorating income inequality. This paper 
argues that a gradual increase in social spending could promote more sustainable and inclusive 
growth in Korea. In particular, simulation results suggest that social spending which supports 
labor market reforms can boost longer-term growth. However, despite rapid increases 
recently—albeit from a low base—there is still a social spending gap relative to Korea’s OECD 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Looking ahead, Korea faces two intertwined fundamental challenges: sustaining economic 
growth in the face of rapid population aging and ameliorating income inequality. Against this 
backdrop, one of the questions this paper attempts to address is whether social spending can 
reduce income inequality and, at the same time, increase longer-term growth. In most general 
terms, social spending is related to a broad range of social welfare programs pertaining to 
healthcare, education, and social safety nets (which, for example, could include pension plans 
and income support for both the working-age and elderly population). Agreeing on a more 
specific definition may not be trivial, because, while similarities exist, social spending policies 
vary across countries. 
 
Social spending can foster more sustainable and inclusive growth in Korea. The argument that 
growth can help reduce income inequality is well known. However, social spending which 
improves income equality can also boost growth. As discussed in further detail below, social 
spending can address the issue of Korea’s declining working-age population, help boost 
productivity (particularly in the services sector), and promote more inclusive growth. In fact, a 
combination of well-designed social spending policies has the potential to catalyze virtuous 
cycles whereby lower inequality and stronger growth mutually reinforce each other. 
 
II.   SOCIAL SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Korea has been one of the fastest-growing countries in the world, allowing it to substantially 
narrow the per capita income gap with other 
advanced economies (Figure 1). Nonetheless, 
sustaining the convergence process will become 
increasingly challenging. This is because Korea, 
as an advanced industrialized economy, has 
moved closer to the global technology frontier 
and has a rapidly aging population. According to 
the OECD (2012), the convergence in income 
levels continued despite a slowdown in Korea’s 
potential growth from 7 percent in 1995 to 
around 4 percent by 2010. Therefore, unless 
policies can help prevent the expected 
downtrend in productivity and labor inputs, the potential growth rate is expected to decline 
further.  
 
Social spending can promote sustainable longer-term growth in Korea, by focusing on three 
related challenges: (i) increasing labor market participation against the backdrop of a rapidly 
aging population, (ii) reducing duality in the labor market, and (iii) boosting productivity in the 
services sector.  
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Figure 1. Real GDP Growth
(In percent)
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Figure 2. Korea: Population Projections
(In thousands)
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Challenge 1: Increasing labor market participation 
 
While estimates of the precise timing vary, the labor force is expected to peak within the 
coming decade in line with a decline in the population (Figure 2). The most important strategy 
to mitigate demographic change would be to increase the female labor force participation rate. 
For women between the ages of 25 and 54, the labor force participation rate was 62 percent in 
2010, the third lowest in the OECD area (Figure 3). Factors that hinder female labor market 
participation include, among others, a gender wage gap and the lack of affordable, high-quality 
childcare services.  
 
 
Challenge 2: Reducing labor market dualism 
 
Along with regular workers, Korean labor market duality stems from the elevated and rising 
share of non-regular workers—which include temporary workers (Figure 4), a major source of 
a income inequality (Koske and Wanner, 2011). 
Korea’s rapid integration in a globalized 
economy, particularly after the mid-1990s, 
intensified competition, which prompted firms 
to reduce labor costs and increase temporary 
hiring, given the difficulty and cost of laying off 
regular workers (Koh, 2011). While regular 
workers are characterized by high wages, high 
employment protection, and broad coverage by 
the social safety net (and active labor market 
policies), non-regular workers face low wages, 
unstable employment, low employment 
protection, and weak coverage by the social safety net. As a group, non-regular workers tend to 
be older, less educated, employed in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have shorter 
tenure, and work in the service sector. In addition, women are over-represented, with 42 percent 
of female employees in non-regular employment compared to 28 percent of males. 
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Labor market duality also hinders productivity growth. The largest component of non-regular 
employment consists of temporary workers, and is associated with increased worker turnover 
and reduced firm-based training. This lack of firm-based training is compounded by low public 
spending on training, which is one of the lowest in the OECD area. Low productivity in the 
service sector translates into lower wages, and because of the disproportionate share of female 
employees in this sector, further aggravates the gender wage gap and increases in income 
inequality. 
 
Challenge 3: Boosting productivity in the service sector 
 
Increasing productivity in the services sector presents an opportunity that would underpin 
longer-term growth in Korea. Manufacturing has 
driven Korea’s rapid economic development, 
making it a leading industrial power. In contrast, 
its service sector, which is dominated by SMEs, is 
much smaller and markedly less productive 
(Figure 5). Over the past 25 years nearly 85 
percent of GDP growth in high-income countries 
came from services (McKinsey, 2010). In order 
for Korea to converge to the income levels in the 
most advanced countries, making the services 
sector the second engine of economic growth is 
required. 2 
 
III.   HOW CAN SOCIAL SPENDING PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH? 
Education has played a key role in Korea’s rapid development. The emphasis on universal 
access to primary and secondary schools was a factor that contributed to Korea’s early growth 
take-off, and promoted social mobility and income equality (Koh, 2011). Despite these 
advances, several aspects of the Korean education system raise equity issues, including low 
investment in pre-primary education and the heavy reliance on private tutoring, among others. 
Therefore, some aspects of the education system today should be improved, given that policies 
that promote equal access to education help reduce inequality (OECD, 2012).  
 
Education reform can foster stronger growth over the longer term. For example, expanded 
vocational training and career consultation outside firms could enhance the employment 
prospects of non-regular workers and facilitate their transition to regular status. Along with 
                                                 
2 Problems in services are linked to those of SMEs, which account for about 90 percent of service-sector 
employment. The weakness of SMEs prompted the government to ratchet up support, which has blunted 
competitive pressures, slowed reform, and reduced the efficiency of resource allocation. Supporting non-viable 
firms will act as a drag on Korea’s growth potential, and should gradually be unwound. 
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Figure 5. Service Sector Productivity Relative to 
Manufacturing in 2007
Sources: OECD; and author's calculations.
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reduced employment protection for regular workers, such reforms would promote a less rigid 
labor market, facilitate mobility and restructuring, thereby increasing the Korean economy’s 
resilience to shocks. These reforms are in line with the Korean authorities’ view as well as some 
recent initiatives which promote workfare, with the intent of incentivizing work, and thus 
implementing measures which support training expenses related to skills improvement, provide 
job-seeking allowances, and offer expanded earned income tax credit (EITC) benefits. 
 
Specific social spending policies can nurture growth in several dimensions. For example, 
investment in early childhood education and care (ECEC) offers a high return by boosting the 
later achievement of children. While Korea has expanded public outlays for ECEC, in general, 
spending on pre-primary education was only 0.2 percent of GDP in 2008, the second lowest in 
the OECD area (OECD, 2012). Greater ECEC investment would provide a better educational 
foundation for children from low-income households, which would underpin future productivity 
gains. At the same time, the greater availability of affordable, high-quality childcare would 
promote greater participation in the labor market by females, particularly after childbirth. Taken 
together, targeted social spending policies, such as ECEC, would help increase labor market 
participation (by females especially), serve to boost productivity (especially in the services 
sector), and promote sustainable and inclusive growth going forward. 
 
Model-based simulations indicate that social spending which encourages labor market reforms 
can boost longer-term growth. A general equilibrium model (described in the Appendix) is used 
to generate illustrative scenarios which show that a more competitive labor market associated 
with increased social spending implies a higher level of potential output. Social spending 
policies, including those discussed above, could help reduce duality in the labor market and, at 
the same time, increase female labor market participation. In turn, these developments would 
bring about a more competitive labor market with reduced inefficiencies and a greater supply of 
labor inputs, resulting in a higher potential output. As shown in Table 1 (row F, bottom panel), 
a less rigid and more competitive labor market could boost potential output by around 1 percent 
every year over the next decade. In other words, along with addressing inequality, social 
spending-induced labor market reforms can also boost longer-term growth. 
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Markup η
λ (In percent) 1 2 3 4 5
3 50.0 0.8165 0.8736 0.9036 0.9221 0.9347
5 25.0 0.8944 0.9283 0.9457 0.9564 0.9635
6 20.0 0.9129 0.9410 0.9554 0.9642 0.9701
9 12.5 0.9428 0.9615 0.9710 0.9767 0.9806
11 10.0 0.9535 0.9687 0.9765 0.9811 0.9842
21 5.0 0.9759 0.9839 0.9879 0.9903 0.9919
51 2.0 0.9901 0.9934 0.9951 0.9960 0.9967
101 1.0 0.9950 0.9967 0.9975 0.9980 0.9983
Change in 
wage markup
(range)
[ A ] 20-5 6.9 4.6 3.4 2.7 2.3
[ B ] 25-2 10.7 7.0 5.2 4.2 3.4
[ C ] 20-5 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5
[ D ] 25-2 2.1 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7
[ E ] 20-5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2
[ F ] 25-2 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3
Source: Author's calculations.
Note: The value of 1.1 in row F, under column with parameter, η , set to unity implies
that a decrease in the wage markup from 25 percent to 2 percent could boost potential
output by 1.1 percent per year over the next decade.
Table 1. Output Gains From Social Spending-Induced Labor Market Reforms
Potential Ouput Gains Associated with Labor Market Reforms
Range of potential output gains over the next 10 years
(In percent)
Steady-state level of output
Range of potential output gains
(In percent)
Range of potential output gains over the next 5 years
(In percent)
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IV.   SOCIAL SPENDING AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
Over the last decade, Korea’s high real GDP growth rates have not been sufficient by 
themselves to fully address the problems of inequality. Between 1960 and the mid-1990s, Korea 
achieved one of the highest growth rates in the world. At the same time, its income distribution 
stood out as one of the most equitable among developing countries (Sakong, 1993). Korea’s 
outstanding performance was cited as support for the hypothesis that a positive relationship 
exists between growth and equity (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). However, after the recession in 
the late 1990s, there was a jump in income inequality. Current data indicate that while Korea’s 
Gini coefficient is below the OECD average; its relative poverty rate (another measure of 
income inequality) was 15 percent in 2008, the seventh highest in the OECD area (Figure 6).3 
 
Figure 6. OECD: Gini Coefficients and Relative Poverty Rates 
 
Source: OECD. 
Note:  Data for late 2000s. The Gini coefficient can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect 
inequality). Relative poverty is defined as the share of the population that lives on less than half of the 
median income. 
 
Recent developments suggest that key social indicators are beginning to improve. Despite 
Korea’s high real GDP growth rates, certain measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient, 
the relative poverty ratio, and the LH ratio, have been trending upward over the last decade, 
indicating deteriorating socio-economic conditions (Figure 7). However, more recently, these 
unfavorable inequality-related trends seem to have reversed or stabilized. Additionally, after 
spiking in the late 1990s, the unemployment rate in Korea came back down, and remains at a 
low level, especially in contrast to the OECD average (Figure 8). The evolution of the 
unemployment rate in Korea, especially more recently, is a general indicator of improving 
                                                 
3 Recall that the Gini coefficient can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The relative poverty 
ratio is defined as the share of the population that lives on less than half of the median income (and therefore 
another measure of income inequality). For later reference, the LH ratio measures the share of income of the lowest 
quintile (richest) to the highest quintile (poorest). 
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9 
social conditions, and could be taken as a sign that progress in reducing inequality is more 
enduring.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social spending has increased rapidly, albeit from a low base. Public social spending tripled its 
share of GDP to 7.6 percent in 2007, from 2.8 percent in 1990 (Figure 9). Nevertheless, this 
upward trend has not been able to arrest the 
deterioration in the income distribution over 
most of the last decade. There are many 
potential factors responsible for rising 
inequality, including those related to 
technological progress and globalization. In the 
case of Korea, a key factor was the structural 
change in the economy, including a shift from 
high-paying jobs in manufacturing to lower-
paying jobs in services. Labor market dualism, 
which results in large wage gaps between 
regular and non-regular workers, is another 
dimension of inequality. These developments motivate the need to reconsider expanding social 
spending programs and expediting labor market reforms. 
Source: Statistics Korea
Source: Statistics Korea.
Note: The Gini coefficient can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). Relative poverty is defined as the 
share of the population that lives on less than half of the median income. The LH ratio measures that share of income of 
the lowest quintile (richest) to the highest quintile (poorest).
Figure 7. Korea: Income Inequality Indicators
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Social spending in Korea is low when compared to its peers across the OECD. In 2007, the 
latest year with cross-country comparable data available, Korea had the second lowest level of 
public social spending (Figure 10). In particular, public social spending in Korea was lower 
than the OECD average in each of the following major areas: health care, pensions, and income 
support to the working-age population (which include, for example, unemployment benefits, 
Figure 11). Within the OECD, note also that both family- and old age-related expenditures in 
Korea rank relatively low.  
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Figure 10. OECD: Social Spending in 2007 
(In percent of GDP)
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  Source: OECD.
Figure 11. OECD: Social Spending Categories in 2007
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Taking into consideration Korea’s specific characteristics suggests a lower social spending gap 
with respect to the OECD average. An initial comparison of social spending indicates that there 
is a social spending gap of about 11.7 percentage points of GDP between Korea and the average 
of its OECD peers. When compared to the OECD average, however, Korea has one of the 
lowest unemployment rates, currently has a younger population, and despite years of rapid 
growth, convergence in per capita income is ongoing (Figure 12). Econometric analysis 
suggests that when these characteristics are factored in, Korea’s current social spending needs 
may be relatively lower. Using the sample of OECD countries, the analysis relates social 
spending in 2007 to the unemployment rate, per capita income, and a dependency ratio.4 When 
these characteristics are formally taken into account, regression analysis suggests that the social 
spending gap narrows to about 3.4 percentage points (Table 2). Indeed in the first column, 
without any explanatory variables, the spending gap is 11.7 percentage points (of GDP). 
However, when the three main factors which differentiate Korea from the OECD average are 
taken explicitly into account, the spending gap decreases (as shown under the remaining 
columns). These results are generally quite robust; in fact, using quantile regressions which 
control for outliers (the last column) suggests an even smaller social spending gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Using the sample of OECD countries in 2007, public social spending (as a percent of GDP, OECD data), the 
dependent variable, was regressed against a constant, the unemployment rate, PPP per capita income, and a 
dependency ratio (population 65 and over divided, by population 30 to 64, UN data). Other specifications, 
including different variable choices, yield broadly similar results. 
Dependent variable: 
Social spending in 2007
Explantory variables: [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ]  [ 5 ]
Constant 19.24 -0.29 6.22 -5.67 -5.35
20.45 -0.10 1.51 -1.74 -1.32
Dependency ratio 63.66 0.95 56.40 64.13
7.15 2.43 6.51 4.53
Per capital income 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
3.08 2.45 0.88
Unemployment rate 0.60 0.34
2.30 1.14
Number of observations 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.61 0.26 0.69 0.49
Social spending gap: 11.7 4.9 5.0 3.4 3.1
Source: Author's calculations.
Note: p-values below regressions estimates. 
Table 2. Korea: Social Spending Gap
13 
 
 
To ensure more inclusive growth, social spending should be targeted to help those most in 
need.5 Social spending is not well targeted on low-income households, with only a quarter of 
cash benefits from the government going to the poorest quintile of the population (OECD, 
2012). In addition, as discussed below, spending on health could actually defray the costs 
associated with a rapidly aging population. Accordingly, social spending priorities that could 
most effectively promote inclusive growth include the following: 
 
 National Health Insurance (NHI) aims at universal coverage, but is associated with high 
out-of-pocket payments which are inequitable and regressive because they do not 
depend on the income of patients. The NHI could therefore be reformed, to promote, 
among others, healthy ageing, which would limit future healthcare costs as the 
                                                 
5 For additional perspective, see Balakrishnan and others (2011). 
Figure 12. Selected Indicators Influencing the Social Spending Gap
Sources: United Nations, IMF (World Economic Outlook database).
Note: Dependency ratio defined as the population 65 and over, divided by the population between 30 to 64. Per 
capita income levels in U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power.
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population ages. This is critical because, under current policies, population ageing alone 
is projected to increase expenditures in the form of pensions, health care, and long-term 
care, by almost 11 percent of GDP over the next 50 years (Feyzioglu, Skaarup, and 
Syed, 2008). 
 The Basic Livelihood Security System (BLSP) is Korea’s major welfare program, 
providing cash and a package of in-kind benefits, including housing, medical and 
educational benefits to the most vulnerable segments of society. But, under this program, 
benefits are provided to only 3 percent of the population, suggesting that there is scope 
for better targeting. In order to increase its effectiveness, BLSP eligibility conditions 
should be relaxed to cover a larger share of those in need.  
 The Basic Old-Age Pension System, introduced in 2008, provides assistance to elderly 
people who meet the income and asset criteria. At present, around 70 percent of the 
elderly receive the benefit, which is set at only 5 percent of the average wage, implying 
that the benefit spreads out resources very thinly over a large segment of the older 
population, while doing little to reduce income inequality among the elderly. Noting that 
about 40 percent of the elderly have income below the minimum cost of living (Bae, 
2011) suggests that a larger benefit that is more targeted at low-income elderly would be 
more effective. 
 The earned income tax credit (EITC) reduces taxes or provides a refund when the 
deduction is larger than the tax amount, raising take-home pay at the low end of the 
income distribution. The EITC is used in a number of OECD countries and is another 
important tool for reducing income inequality. Therefore, to have a more significant 
effect on income distribution, the number of recipients and the amount of benefits 
provided by the EITC should be expanded. The EITC would also make any possible 
raises in the VAT more equitable. 
V.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In general, social spending increases should advance incrementally for several reasons:  
 
 In the near term, fiscal consolidation will limit available resources to fund major 
expansions in social welfare programs. 
 Over the longer term, costs owing to rapid population aging and will also put strains on 
the budget. 
 While there may be room for expenditure reallocation (by squeezing non-age-related 
outlays), there are limits to how much other sending can be reduced, and the government 
should move cautiously when contemplating increases in social spending given the 
difficulty of scaling back social spending, as seen in some European countries more 
recently. 
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 Certain revenue measures—including those which could be used to offset cost 
associated with population aging—may have a negative impact on growth potential. 
Indeed, pro-growth tax policy which could be used to finance expanded social welfare 
programs calls for limiting any increase in the tax wedge on labor income and keeping a 
low corporate tax rate. Given Korea’s relatively low VAT rate, and that such taxes 
generally have a smaller negative effect on labor supply, any increase in the VAT could 
be combined with an EITC to promote more inclusive growth.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
There seems to be an opportunity to gradually enhance social spending and thereby promote 
more inclusive and sustainable growth in Korea. While social spending in Korea is low when 
compared to its peers across the OECD, any increase should be incremental, and accompanied 
by strengthened revenue performance over the medium term (including by base broadening). 
Measures should prioritize spending in areas that would increase labor market participation, 
reduce duality in the labor market, and boost productivity. In sum, a combination of targeted 
social spending policies would further help reduce income inequality, but also boost potential 
growth over the longer term. 
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Appendix: Model Overview 
 
This section provides an outline of the general equilibrium model used for the illustrative 
scenarios relating labor market reforms, increased social spending, and longer-term potential 
growth. The model is a markedly simplified version of Alp, Elekdag, and Lall (2012) and 
conducts simulations similar to those presented in Chami, Elekdag, and Tchakarov (2004). In 
what follows, the goal here is to present the general intuition of the model, leaving the details to 
the indicated studies. 
 
Using the model, it is argued that as duality in the labor market decreases, implying efficiency 
gains, lower deadweight losses, and an attendant increase in labor supply (including greater 
female labor market participation, especially because they account for a disproportionate share 
of temporary workers). In sum, along with addressing inequality, social spending-induced labor 
market reforms can also boost longer-term growth. 
 
Firms 
 
Output is generated using a linear production technology with labor inputs (L) augmented by 
total factor productivity (A): 
 
௧ܻ ൌ ܣ௧ܮ௧ 
 
Furthermore, the firm uses a CES combination of differentiated labor inputs. The idea is to 
capture the notion of labor market duality which is pervasive in the Korean economy. It is 
difficult and costly to lay off regular workers due to their intrinsic market power as they benefit 
from higher wages and higher employment protection, in marked contrast to temporary workers.  
 
ܮ௧ ൌ ቈන ܮ௜,௧
ఒିଵ
ఒ ݀݅
ଵ
଴
቉
ఒ
ఒିଵ
 
 
Here, ܮ௜ denotes the demand of a differentiated labor input, and the parameter, ߣ ൐ 1, is the 
elasticity of substitution among labor inputs. Broadly speaking, the extent of labor input 
differentiation, and the degree of market power is captured by ߣ. In other words, the labor 
market is characterized by a monopolistically competitive environment. This lack of perfect 
competition is characterized by a markup, determined by the size of the parameter, ߣ, and drives 
a wedge between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure. As this parameter approaches infinity, labor inputs can be thought of becoming 
increasingly similar, which erodes the monopolistic structure of the market. The loss of market 
power is associated with increased labor inputs, reduced deadweight losses, and the eventual 
perfectly competitive environment is thereby associated with a higher level of potential output. 
 
Firms take the prices of labor inputs as given, and cost minimization implies that the demand for 
a certain type of labor input is a function of its relative wage: 
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ܮ௜,௧ ൌ ൬ ௜ܹ,௧௧ܹ ൰
ିఒ
ܮ௧ 
 
Where ܮ௜, is the wage paid for labor input ܮ௜, and the wage index, W, is defined as: 
 
௧ܹ ൌ ቈන ௜ܹ,௧ଵିఒ݀݅
ଵ
଴
቉
ଵ
ఒିଵ
 
 
Against this background, which will be useful below, note that cost minimization by the firm is 
a standard static problem implying that the real wage equals total factor productivity. 
 
Households 
 
Within the confines of their budget constraints, households maximize lifetime expected utility: 
 
௧ܷ ൌ ۳଴෍ߚ௧ ൤݈݋݃ܥ௧ െ 11 ൅ ߟ ܮ௧
ଵାఎ൨
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
 
where household preferences are additively separable in consumption, C, and labor effort, L, 
and the discount rate, β, is bounded by zero and unity. The flow budget constraint states that 
consumption is limited to the total wage bill, and any residual income, Π, (for example, 
stemming from labor union premiums): 
 
ܥ௧ ൌ ௧ܹ௧ܲ ܮ௧ ൅ ߎ௧ 
 
Because the focus is on comparative static simulations, borrowing and saving by the households 
was not necessary for the purposes here, and thus not modeled. As with other many features of 
this model, this is another dimension that could be readily developed.  
 
As discussed above, each household is the monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor input. 
Given their market power, households set the nominal wage for their specific labor input facing 
a downward-sloping demand curve.  
 
Solution  
 
Overall, in the steady state, the model boils down to four key equations: the production 
function, the budget constraint, the condition linking the real wage and total factor productivity, 
and equation stating that the real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure, but augmented with a markup. Note that with ߣ ൌ 11, for example, 
the gross markup, ߣ/ሺߣ െ 1ሻ, takes a value of 1.1 (implying real wages that are 10 percent 
higher than under a perfectly competitive labor market). 
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ܻ ൌ ܣܮ 
 
ܥ ൌ ܹܲ ܮ ൅ ߎ 
 
ܹ
ܲ ൌ ܣ 
 
ܹ
ܲ ൌ
ߣ
ߣ െ 1ܥܮ
ఎ 
 
Because total factor productivity is exogenous, A, is essentially unity, and the system can be 
solved for output as follows: 
 
ܻ ൌ ൤ߣ െ 1ߣ ൨
ଵ
ଵାఎ
 
 
In sum, the steady-state level of output, or for our purposes, potential output, depends on the 
calibration of two parameters, of which, the elasticity of substitution among labor inputs, the 
parameter, ߣ ൐ 1, is most critical. Studies estimating structural model developed to capture 
salient features of the Korean economy by Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006), and Alp, 
Elekdag, and Lall (2012) find that while the parameter, η, can range between 1.5 and 2.5, the 
substitution elasticity, ߣ, is typically in the 7 to 9 range, implying a wage markup of around 15 
percent, in other words, the labor market is characterized by a notable degree of monopolistic 
competition. 
 
Model Simulations 
 
Can lower labor market rigidity boost potential growth? Using the model, illustrative scenarios 
are generated which show that a more competitive labor market—brought on, in part, by higher 
social spending—implies a higher level of potential output. As duality in the labor market 
decreases, this implies efficiency gains, less deadweight losses, and a likely increase in female 
labor market participation (as they account for a disproportionate share of temporary workers). 
To do so, we start off with a high degree of monopolistic competition in the labor market as set 
the elasticity, ߣ, to three as shown in Table 1. Then the elasticity is increased, corresponding to 
a more competitive labor market (with an attendant decrease in duality). While the elasticity 
maybe a relatively abstract notion, the implied markups are also included in the table to 
facilitate intuition. Notice that as the elasticity increases (implying that labor inputs are more 
readily substitutable), the wage markup decreases as market power is eroded owing to labor 
market reforms.  
 
A less rigid labor market implies a higher level of potential output. As shown in the table, if 
wage markups decrease from 25 percent (in line with the estimated values found in the studies 
cited above) to 2 percent, potential output could increase by 10.7 percent (row [ B ] in the 
bottom panel, with η=1). These are gains over the long run, but if it is assumed that they could 
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be materialized in the next decade, this implies a boost to potential output by around 1.1 percent 
every year (under same column with η=1, in row [ F ]). Note that this main message is robust to 
other parameter choices. Taken together, social spending-induced labor market reforms can 
ameliorate income inequality and also boost longer-term growth. 
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